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Abstract
There are two foundational, but not fully developed, ideas in para-
consistency, namely, the duality between paraconsistent and intuition-
istic paradigms, and the introduction of logical operators that express
meta-logical notions in the object language. The aim of this paper is
to show how these two ideas can be adequately accomplished by the
Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and by the Logics of Formal
Undeterminedness (LFUs). LFIs recover the validity of the principle
of explosion in a paraconsistent scenario, while LFUs recover the va-
lidity of the principle of excluded middle in a paracomplete scenario.
We introduce definitions of duality between inference rules and con-
nectives that allow comparing rules and connectives that belong to
different logics. Two formal systems are studied, the logics mbC and
mbD, that display the duality between paraconsistency and paracom-
pleteness as a duality between inference rules added to a common core
– in the case studied here, this common core is classical positive propo-
sitional logic (CPL+). The logics mbC and mbD are equipped with
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recovery operators that restore classical logic for, respectively, consis-
tent and determined propositions. These two logics are then combined
obtaining a pair of logics of formal inconsistency and undetermined-
ness (LFIUs), namely, mbCD and mbCDE. The logic mbCDE
exhibits some nice duality properties. Besides, it is simultaneously
paraconsistent and paracomplete, and able to recover the principles
of excluded middle and explosion at once. The last sections offer an
algebraic account for such logics by adapting the swap-structures se-
mantics framework of the LFIs the LFUs. This semantics highlights
some subtle aspects of these logics, and allows us to prove decidability
by means of finite non-deterministic matrices.
1 Introduction
Although paraconsistent logics have not been invented by da Costa, it is
fairly certain that in 1963 da Costa [17] not only presented the broadest
formal study of paraconsistency proposed up to that time but also estab-
lished a fruitful research program in logic and philosophy of logic.1 The role
of da Costa’s work in establishing paraconsistency as an area of study is
undisputed.
There are two foundational ideas in da Costa’s approach to paracon-
sistency. The first is the division of propositions into two groups: those for
which explosion does not hold and those for which explosion holds. The latter
are called ‘well-behaved’, which means that the principle of non-contradiction
holds for them. It is safe to employ classical logic only for well-behaved
propositions, while the others demand a non-explosive logic. The second
idea is the duality between da Costa’s logic C1 and intuitionistic logic. It
is clear that some kind of duality between paraconsistent and intuitionistic
logic has had an important role as a motivation for the axioms da Costa
chose for C1. However, we argue here that da Costa not only missed the
point regarding the duality but also mistakenly emphasized the invalidity of
non-contradiction instead of explosion as the central feature of paraconsis-
tent logics. The aim of this paper is to show how these two ideas can be
developed by Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Formal
1The concept of a logic without an explosive negation can be traced back to 1910,
in the work of Vasiliev (see [26] pp. 307ff), while the first non-explosive logic has been
presented in 1948 by Jaśkowski in [28]. For a comprehensive account of the history of
paraconsistency, see Gomes [26]
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Undeterminedness (LFUs). The former recovers the validity of the principle
of explosion in a paraconsistent scenario, while the latter recovers the validity
of the excluded middle in a paracomplete scenario.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines
how da Costa presented the well-behavedness operator and the ‘duality’ be-
tween C1 and intuitionistic logic. In Section 3 we present the consistency
and determinedness connectives ◦ and 9 as recovery operators that restore,
respectively, explosion and excluded middle. Section 4 presents two formal
systems, the logics mbC and mbD, that display the duality between para-
consistency and paracompleteness as a duality between inference rules added
to a common core – in the case studied here, classical positive propositional
logic (CPL+). mbC andmbD are equipped with recovery operators that re-
store classical logic for, respectively, consistent and determined propositions.
These two logics are then combined obtaining the logics of formal inconsis-
tency and undeterminedness (LFIUs), mbCD and mbCDE. Finally, the
swap structures semantics framework for LFIs, introduced by Carnielli and
Coniglio in [7, chapter 6], is adapted here for LFUs and LFIUs. This se-
mantics allows us to prove the decidability of the proposed systems by means
of finite non-deterministic matrices.
2 Well-behavedness and ‘duality’ in da Costa’s
Cn hierarchy
2.1 da Costa’s well-behavedness operator
We begin by defining da Costa’s Cn hierarchy.
Definition 1 (Intuitionistic Positive Logic) The intuitionistic positive
logic IPL+ is defined over the signature Σ+ = {∧,∨,→} by the following
Hilbert calculus:
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Axiom schemas:
α→ (β → α) (AX1 )(
α→ (β → γ))→ ((α→ β)→ (α→ γ)) (AX2 )
α→ (β → (α ∧ β)) (AX3 )(
α ∧ β)→ α (AX4 )(
α ∧ β)→ β (AX5 )
α→ (α ∨ β) (AX6 )
β → (α ∨ β) (AX7 )(
α→ γ)→ ((β → γ)→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ)) (AX8 )
Inference rule:
α α→ β
β
(MP)
Definition 2 (da Costa’s Cn hierarchy) Let 1 ≤ n < ω. The system Cn
is defined over the signature ΣC = {∧,∨,→,¬} by adding to the axioms of
intuitionistic positive logic IPL+ the following axiom schemas (see [17]):
α ∨ ¬α (AxPEM )
¬¬α→ α (AxDN )
β(n) → ((α→ β)→ ((α→ ¬β)→ ¬α)) (AxCn1 )(
α(n) ∧ β(n))→ ((α ∧ β)(n) ∧ (α ∨ β)(n) ∧ (α→ β)(n)) (AxCn2 )
Notice that the Cn hierarchy is defined as an extension of IPL+ but it is also
an extension of Classical Positive Logic CPL+, since (α → β) ∨ α (AX9 in
Definition 14) can be proved in it. Each calculus of da Costa’s Cn hierarchy
has its own ‘well-behavedness’ operator, defined inductively such that, for
each n, 1 ≤ n < ω,
α,¬α 0Cn β, while α(n), α,¬α `Cn β.
In formal terms:
Definition 3 Let α be a formula in the signature ΣC and consider the fol-
lowing abbreviations:
(1) α◦ def= ¬(α ∧ ¬α);
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(2) α0 def= α, and αn+1 def= (αn)◦, for 0 ≤ n < ω;
(3) α(1) def= α◦, and α(n+1) def= α(n) ∧ αn+1, for 1 ≤ n < ω.
For instance, α1 = α(1) = α◦; α2 = α◦◦ and α(2) = α◦ ∧ α◦◦; while α3 = α◦◦◦
and α(3) = (α◦ ∧ α◦◦) ∧ α◦◦◦. Thus, a proposition α behaves classically:
in C1, when α(1) = α◦ = ¬(α ∧ ¬α) holds,
in C2, when α(2) = α◦ ∧ α◦◦ holds,
in C3, when α(3) = (α◦ ∧ α◦◦) ∧ α◦◦◦ holds,
and so on. As the value of n grows, the negation gets weaker, and a monotonic
hierarchy of logics is obtained. However, until now, this idea of increasingly
weaker logics has not been as successful as the introduction of an operator
capable of expressing metalogical notions in the object language.2
A not well-behaved proposition α does not cause any harm in C1, if it
is contradictory. On the other hand, α ∧ ¬α and ¬(α ∧ ¬α) cannot hold
simultaneously: the latter by definition is α◦, and so, together with α ∧ ¬α,
triviality follows. Thus, α ∧ ¬α is ‘axiomatically well-behaved’ in C1. This
seems strange: the point is not that in a paraconsistent logic α∧¬α and ¬(α∧
¬α) must always be allowed to hold simultaneously. The point, rather, is that
α∧¬α and ¬(α∧¬α) should not be prohibited to hold simultaneously. So, it
should be possible to devise paraconsistent logics such that the consistency
of α is logically independent of ¬(α ∧ ¬α).
The Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs, see [7], [8] and [9]) are para-
consistent logics that develop da Costa’s approach further by internalizing
the concept of consistency within the object language using the connective ◦.
In LFIs ◦α means that α is consistent, but ◦ is introduced in such a way that
◦α is logically independent of ¬(α ∧ ¬α). Analogously to the Cn hierarchy,
α,¬α 0LFI β, while ◦α, α,¬α `LFI β.
Splitting propositions into two classes, consistent and the inconsistent, is
in accordance with the fact that in a paraconsistent logic it cannot be that all
contradictions are logically equivalent, otherwise the principle of explosion
holds. The proof of this fact is straightforward. If all contradictions are
2Instead of a hierarchy in which negations get weaker, a hierarchy of logics in which
consistency gets stronger will be presented in Section 4.2.
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equivalent, then α ∧ ¬α ` β ∧ ¬β, for any α and β. Hence, by elimination
of conjunction, α ∧ ¬α ` β. So, if a logic is paraconsistent, then it has
some pairs of non-equivalent contradictions. This fact fits the idea that in
real-life contexts of reasoning some contradictions are more relevant than
others. Thus, it is natural to devise a connective that is able to distinguish
between different kinds of contradictions – and this is precisely the feature
of da Costa’s approach that has led to the introduction of LFIs.
At first glance, it may seem that the consistency operator of LFIs and the
well-behavedness operator of da Costa’s Cn hierarchy (recall that α◦ means
that α is well-behaved) are the same thing when applied to a proposition
α. This view, however, is mistaken. LFIs are a generalization of da Costa’s
idea of expressing the meta-logical notion of consistency inside the object
language. Even though the logics of Cn hierarchy (for 1 ≤ n < ω) end up
being a special case of LFIs, an important point distinguishes LFIs from
da Costa’s Cn. In the latter, as we have just seen, α◦ is an abbreviation of
¬(α∧¬α), while in LFIs the unary connective ◦ may be primitive and logi-
cally independent from non-contradiction. So, in some LFIs, the equivalence
between ◦α and ¬(α ∧ ¬α) does not hold.3
2.2 ‘Duality’ in da Costa’s logics
We now turn to the role of the duality between paraconsistent and intu-
itionistic logics in da Costa’s Cn hierarchy. Although the central feature of
paraconsistent logics is the invalidity of the principle of explosion, da Costa in
[17] and [18], emphasizes the invalidity of the principle of non-contradiction
and takes a path longer than would be necessary to recover classical logic.
Let us restrict ourselves to C1, what is enough to establish our point. In C1
(see Definition 2), classical logic is recovered for well-behaved formulas by
means of the following axiom:
α◦ → ((β → α)→ ((β → ¬α)→ ¬β))
3The operator ◦ as a primitive operator, not definable in terms of non-contradiction,
appears for the first time in Carnielli and Marcos [9], where the logics of formal inconsis-
tency (LFIs) have been introduced. For more precise historical details, LFIs appeared for
the first time in the II World Congress on Paraconsistency, held in Juquehy, SP, Brazil, in
May, 2000, dedicated to the 70th birthday of Newton da Costa. ‘A taxonomy of C-systems’
[9], was published in the proceedings of this event.
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where α◦ is defined as ¬(α ∧ ¬α) and means that α is ‘well-behaved’. Since
the emphasis is put on the invalidity of non-contradiction, explosion is recov-
ered through an unnecessary roundabout.4 On the other hand, in LFIs the
principle of explosion is recovered directly, by the axiom
◦α→ (α→ (¬α→ β))
or an equivalent inference rule. Thus, the emphasis is not on the principle
of non-contradiction, but rather on the principle of explosion, i.e. on an
inference that concludes anything from a contradiction.
It seems to us that what impelled da Costa in placing the emphasis on
non-contradiction was a misunderstanding of the nature of the duality be-
tween paraconsistent and intuitionistic logics. Indeed, if we take a look at
how da Costa devises C1, the first logic of his Cn hierarchy (see Definition 2),
it is not difficult to see that there is a sort of ‘duality’ between C1 and intu-
itionistic logic. Let us consider the formulas below:
(i) ¬(α ∧ ¬α),
(ii) α→ ¬¬α,
(iii) α ∨ ¬α,
(iv) ¬¬α→ α.
Formulas (i) and (ii), non-contradiction and double negation introduction,
hold in intuitionistic logic but do not hold in C1. On the other hand, formulas
(iii) and (iv), excluded middle and double negation elimination, thought by
da Costa to be a kind of ‘dual’ to (i) and (ii), hold in C1 but do not hold
in intuitionistic logic.5 In [17, p. 9], he presents an argument to justify the
validity of (iv) as an axiom of C1 that runs as follows.6
4Suppose α◦, α and ¬α. So, ¬β → α and ¬β → ¬α. From the axiom above we get
¬¬β. Since double negation elimination holds, we obtain β.
5Actually, the invalidity of the principle of non-contradiction is not an essential feature
of paraconsistent logics. An example of a paraconsistent logic where explosion does not
hold but non-contradiction is a valid formula is the logic of paradox (see [33]).
6In the original [17, p. 9]: “ou A é ‘bem comportada’, no sentido de que não são
simultaneamente verdadeiras A e ¬A, sendo, então, de se esperar que se aplique a lógica
clássica, donde ¬¬A→ A; ou A é ‘mal comportada’ e tem-se A e ¬A, advindo que qualquer
proposição deve implicar A e, em particular, que ¬¬A→ A”.
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Either α is well-behaved, in the sense that α and ¬α do not hold
simultaneously, or α is not well-behaved. (i) Suppose α is well-behaved.
In this case, da Costa claims that ‘classical logic may be applied’, which
means, as far as we can see, that classical reasoning holds for α. So,
¬¬α → α. Let us make clear what is going on in this step of the
argument: classical reasoning holds for α; in classical reasoning, ¬¬α
implies α; therefore, ¬¬α→ α holds. Notice that this argument holds
in the metatheory. (ii) Now, suppose α is not well-behaved and both α
and ¬α hold. So, anything implies α, in particular ¬¬α→ α. This step
of the argument is not metatheorical but holds in the object language,
since α→ (β → α) is an axiom in C1.
It seems, however, that an analogous argument would also justify α→ ¬¬α.
Either ¬¬α is well-behaved or it is not. (i) Suppose ¬¬α is well-
behaved and classical reasoning holds for ¬¬α. So, since α implies
¬¬α in classical logic, α → ¬¬α should hold. (ii) Suppose, on the
other hand, that ¬¬α is not well-behaved, and both ¬¬α and ¬¬¬α
hold. As above, any proposition implies ¬¬α, in particular α→ ¬¬α.
The central point here is step (i) of both arguments. If classical logic
holds for α, and the fact that ¬¬α implies α in classical logic is sufficient
to conclude that ¬¬α → α holds, then, when classical logic holds for ¬¬α,
the fact that α implies ¬¬α in classical logic should be sufficient to conclude
that α→ ¬¬α holds. Our conclusion, therefore, is that da Costa’s argument
does not justify the validity of double negation elimination in C1.
It is worth noting that, moreover, rejecting (ii) is strange because its
invalidity does not fit with da Costa’s claim in [17] that in C1 as many
schemas and rules of classical logic as possible should be valid. In fact, double
negation introduction can be added to C1 without affecting its paraconsistent
properties. Let us call the system so obtained C ′1. An adequate semantics
for C ′1 is obtained just by adding the clause
v(α) = 1 =⇒ v(¬¬α) = 1
to the semantics presented in [20] and [30]. Clearly, such semantics does
not validate explosion, and it can easily be proved that C ′1 has no trivial
models. The paraconsistent logic C¬¬1 , stronger than C ′1, has been presented
in [4]. C¬¬1 is obtained by adding to C1 double negation introduction plus the
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axiom ¬(¬α ∧ α) → ¬(α ∧ ¬α). The paraconsistent negation of C¬¬1 is still
closer to classical negation. So, da Costa’s claim that C1 should contain ‘the
maximum possible number of schemes and deduction rules of the classical
calculus’ [17, p. 7] is not really pursued by him.
In the original presentation of C1, it already seems clear that the main
motivation for adopting the formulas (iii) and (iv), and rejecting (i) and
(ii), was to establish a ‘duality’ with intuitionistic logic. But a conclusive
piece of evidence for the above claim can be found in [21] where da Costa
and Marconi present the hierarchy of propositional paracomplete logics Pn.
There, we read:
[in this paper] we describe a hierarchy of paracomplete logics and
mention the possibility of extending it to others [i.e. to some
paracomplete predicate calculi, [21, p. 508]] which are, in a
certain sense, “dual” of the hierarchies [presented in [17], [18] et
al. – i.e. Cn].
The first logic of the Pn hierarchy is P1, obtained by adding to classical
positive logic CPL+ (see Definition 14 below) the following axioms (α∗ is
defined as α ∨ ¬α):
1. α∗ → ((α→ β)→ ((α→ ¬β)→ ¬α)),
2. (α∗ ∧ β∗)→ [(α ∧ β)∗ ∧ (α ∨ β)∗ ∧ (α→ β)∗ ∧ ¬α∗],
3. ¬(α ∧ ¬α),
4. α→ (¬α→ β),
5. α→ ¬¬α.
Marconi and da Costa do not explain exactly why Cn and Pn are “in a certain
sense dual” to each other. There is no precise characterization of duality
between logics in that paper, nor in [17], [18] and [19].7 P1 has axioms 3 and
5 above, precisely the formulas (i) and (ii) whose ‘dual’ formulas have been
adopted in C1. So, it is clear that da Costa erroneously conceived the duality
7Although da Costa says in [19] p. 29 that “a hierarchy of paracomplete logics was
introduced [in [21]], that are «dual», in a precise sense, of some paraconsistent logics
studied in [see [17] and [18]]”, we have not found an explanation of the duality between
the logics of Cn and Pn hierarchies.
9
between paraconsistency and paracompleteness as a duality between non-
contradiction and excluded middle as formulas, and not between explosion
and excluded middle as rules of inference. Notice also that axiom 4, the
principle of explosion, had to be added to the system, together with 3 and 5,
which is not surprising, since non-contradiction and explosion are logically
independent (regarding Pn hierarchy, see also Remark 19 below).
Indeed, there is a duality between paraconsistent and paracomplete (so,
intuitionistic) logics that gives some interesting insights and provides philo-
sophical motivations for both (see [12]). But the central point is not that the
logics are dual, nor that the formulas excluded middle and non-contradiction
are dual. The point is that excluded middle and explosion are dual infer-
ences. In the next section we will take a closer look at this point and show,
based on the duality between paraconsistency and paracompleteness, how
the idea of internalizing metatheoretical notions in the object language may
be further developed.
3 Duality and recovery operators in LFIs and
LFUs
We begin by defining duality between connectives in classical logic.
Definition 4 Two n-ary logical connectives κ1 and κ2 are said to be dual
if ∼κ1(α1, ..., αn) and κ2(∼α1, ...,∼αn) are materially equivalent, where ∼ is
classical negation.
Thus, classical negation ∼ is the dual of itself and ∧ and ∨ are dual of each
other. The idea of duality may also be applied to inference rules. But in order
to do that we have to move to sequent calculus and multiple-conclusion logic.
The symmetry displayed by the rules of Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK
[23] is well known. Gentzen remarks that:
If [the rules] →-IS and →-IA are excluded, the calculus LK is
dual in the following sense: If we reverse all sequents of an LK -
derivation (in which the →-symbol does not occur), i.e., if for
α1...αm ⇒ β1...βn we put β1...βn ⇒ α1...αm, and if we exchange,
in inference figures with two upper sequents, the right- and left-
hand upper sequents, including their derivations, and also replace
every occurrence of ∧ by ∨, ∀ by ∃, ∨ by ∧, and ∃ by ∀ (in the case
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of ∧ and ∨ we also have to interchange the respective scopes of
the symbols, e.g., for β∨α we have to put α∧β, then another LK -
derivation results. This can be seen at once from the schemata.
(Special care was taken to arrange them in such a way as to bring
out their symmetry.) (Cf. H.-A.’s duality principle, p. 62.) [23,
p. 86].
Except for the implication rules R→ and L→, all the other rules, including
the structural ones, have dual in LK. So, we may define:
Definition 5 Two sequent calculi rules R1 and R2 are dual if one is obtained
from the other as follows:
1. For each one of the premises, and for the conclusion, put the succe-
dent in the place of the antecedent and vice-versa – i.e. change each
α1...αm ⇒ β1...βn with β1...βn ⇒ α1...αm;
2. Change the connective of the main formula of the rule with its dual.
Gentzen is also concerned with the order of the formulas, but this does not
matter when we work with multisets. An R∗ rule, yields an L∗d rule (and
vice-versa), with ∗d being the connective dual of ∗. The rules R∨ and L∧ are
dual to each other, as well as the rules L∨ and R∧. R¬ is the dual of L¬,
and vice-versa. The right rules of weakening, contraction and interchange
are dual of the corresponding left rules (and vice-versa), and cut is the dual
of itself. Even the axiom, α ⇒ α, considered as a rule from no premise, is
the dual of itself. So, the sense in which Gentzen says that the system LK
is ‘dual’ is that it has dual inference rules.
Remark 6 The basic idea of multiple-conclusion logic appeared for the first
time in 1935 (see Gentzen [23]). Indeed, multiple-conclusion framework is
suitable for expressing duality between both rules and connectives, but this
is because multiple-conclusion is already duality. Dealing with premises and
conclusions in an uniform way, as multiple-conclusion does, also allows us to
deal uniformly with truth and falsehood: from the point of view of the preser-
vation of truth, an argument goes from premises to conclusion, but from
the point of view of the preservation of falsity, an argument goes the other
way, from conclusion to premises. Since multiple-conclusion considers sets
of premises and sets of conclusions, it acquires a symmetry that is missing in
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the single-conclusion logic. The intuitive, pretheoretical idea of logical con-
sequence is expressed, in multiple-conclusion, in terms of sets: Γ  ∆ holds
when it is not possible that the propositions in Γ are true and the propositions
in ∆ are false. So, if all propositions in Γ are true, some proposition in ∆
is true, and if all propositions in ∆ are false, some proposition in Γ is false.
But in the latter formulation the duality between the quantifiers all and some,
and also between conjunction and disjunction, is already present. It is worth
noting that Gentzen in 1935 [23, see quotation above] says that “Special care
was taken to arrange them [the sequent rules of LK] in such a way as to bring
out their symmetry” and immediately mentions the principle of duality pre-
sented in the first edition (1928) of Hilbert and Ackermann’s book Grundzüge
der Theoretischen Logik. We do not have access to the first edition of this
book, but in [27, §5, p. 16] (translation of the second edition, 1938) such
principle reads: “From a formula α ↔ β which is logically true, and both
of whose sides are formed from elementary sentences and their negations by
conjunction and disjunction only, there results another true equation by the
interchange of ∧ and ∨”. Such principle shows, for example, that the formu-
las α∨(β∧γ)↔ (α∨β)∧(α∨γ) and α∧(β∨γ)↔ (α∧β)∨(α∧γ) are dual to
each other and logically true. It is clear then, that Hilbert and Ackermann’s
principle of duality (1928) already had the basic idea of Gentzen’s sequent
calculus LK (1935) and, moreover, this fact is acknowledged by Gentzen.
Now, consider the negation rules of LK :
Γ⇒ ∆, α
¬α,Γ⇒ ∆ L¬,
Γ, α⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬α,∆ R¬.
Together, they characterize classical negation: in just one step from the
axiom, L¬ and R¬ yield the following sequents
α,¬α⇒ and ⇒ α,¬α
which means that one and at most one between α and ¬α holds. The rules
L¬ and R¬, respectively, are equivalent to explosion and excluded middle in
the sense that a system equivalent to LK can be defined by adding to the
positive fragment of LK the rules below,
Γ, α,¬α⇒ ∆ EXP Γ⇒ α,¬α,∆ PEM.
Let us call LK ′ the positive fragment of LK plus PEM and EXP. In LK ′,
L¬ is obtained by EXP and one application of cut, and R¬ is obtained by
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PEM and one application of cut. EXP and PEM are proved in LK by one
application, respectively, of L¬ and R¬. We prefer to call EXP and PEM
rules with zero premises, rather than axioms, in order to emphasize that EXP
works like a negation-left rule and PEM like a negation-right rule. These
rules are ‘mirror images’ of each other and express the fact that, classically,
anything follows from α ∧ ¬α, and α ∨ ¬α follows from anything.
There are two points about Definition 5 that we want to call attention
to. First, given a certain connective, it provides the dual of that connective
and the rule that governs it. Second, it provides a general criterion that
establishes the duality between connectives and rules that may belong to
different logics.
In a paraconsistent logic, the principle of explosion does not hold in gen-
eral. In an LFI, EXP holds only for ‘consistent’ propositions, i.e.
Γ, ◦α, α,¬α⇒ ∆ EXP
◦.
EXP ◦ says that if a proposition α is marked as consistent, there can be no
contradiction w.r.t. α, on pain of triviality. Now, according to Definition 5,
EXP ◦ can be dualized obtaining the rule:
Γ⇒ 8α, α,¬α,∆ PEM8.
Notice that by dualizing the rule EXP ◦ we obtain not only the connective
8, the dual of ◦, but also a paracomplete negation that is the dual of the
original paraconsistent negation (see Proposition 40 below). This is because
◦ and 8 ‘work together’ with their respective negations (see Section 4.5).
Let us take a look at the undeterminedness connective 8. If both α and
¬α do not hold, then 8α holds. 8α thus means that α is undetermined.
Now, a recovery operator of determinedness 9 may be obtained from 8 if we
look at 9α as the classical negation of 8α, and this is very plausible, since
from the metatheoretical viewpoint, a proposition α is either determined or
undetermined, and not both (we return to this point below), that is:
Γ, 9α⇒ α,¬α,∆ PEM9.
The rule PEM9 recovers the validity of excluded middle for formulas we call
determined. Notice that the operator 9, in turn, is the dual of an inconsis-
tency operator •, given by the following rule:
Γ, α,¬α⇒ •α,∆ EXP
•.
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The four rules EXP •, PEM9, EXP ◦ and PEM8 above (together with the
positive fragment of LK ) are provably equivalent to the more convenient
rules (proofs left to the reader), as follows:
◦α,Γ⇒ ∆, α
◦α,¬α,Γ⇒ ∆ L¬
◦ Γ, α⇒ 8α,∆
Γ⇒ ¬α, 8α,∆ R¬8
Γ⇒ ∆, α, •α
¬α,Γ⇒ •α,∆ L¬
• Γ, 9α, α⇒ ∆
9α,Γ⇒ ¬α,∆ R¬9
The operators 9 and ◦ are recovery operators in the sense that they recover
a logical property (respectively excluded middle and explosion) for a propo-
sition in their scope.
From an intuitive and metatheorical viewpoint, the connectives ◦ and •,
that represent respectively consistency and inconsistency, behave classically
w.r.t. each other in the sense that
‘α is inconsistent iff it is not the case that α is consistent’.
Analogous reasoning applies to the connectives 9 and 8:
‘α is undetermined iff it is not the case that α is determined’.
Of course, it is presupposed that the metalogical notions that are being
expressed in the object language are such that, given a proposition α, one
and at most one among ◦α and •α holds (mutatis mutandis for 9α and 8α).
So, if classical negation is available, we may define •α as the classical negation
of ◦α, and 8α as the classical negation of 9α (see Section 4.3.1 below).
4 The systems mbC, mbD, mbCD and mbCDE
This section reviews the logicsmbC andmbCD proposed respectively in [9]
and [11], and introduces their new variants mbD and mbCDE. We begin
by defining the languages to be used in the remainder of this paper. Besides
the signatures Σ+ and ΣC (Definitions 1 and 2), the following propositional
signatures will be employed:
Definition 7 (Additional signatures)
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Σ◦ = {∧,∨,→,¬, ◦}
Σ9 = {∧,∨,→,¬, 9}
Σ~ = {∧,∨,→,¬,~}
Σ◦9 = {∧,∨,→,¬, ◦, 9}
where ◦, 9 and ~ are unary connectives.
If Θ is a propositional signature, then For(Θ) will denote the (absolutely
free) algebra of formulas over Θ generated by a given denumerable set V =
{pn : n ∈ N} of propositional variables.
Let us recall from [35] the following useful notions:
Definition 8 (Tarskian logics) Let L = 〈For,`〉 be a logic defined over a
set of formulas For, which has a consequence relation `.
(1) L is said to be Tarskian if it satisfies the following properties, for every
Γ ∪∆ ∪ {α} ⊆ For:
(P1) if α ∈ Γ then Γ ` α (Reflexivity);
(P2) if Γ ` α and Γ ⊆ ∆ then ∆ ` α (Monotonicity);
(P3) if ∆ ` α and Γ ` β for every β ∈ ∆ then Γ ` α (Cut).
(2) L is said to be finitary if it satisfies the following:
(P4) if Γ ` α then there exists a finite subset Γ0 of Γ such that Γ0 ` α.
(3) L is said to be structural if For = For(Θ) for a propositional signature
Θ such that the following property holds:
(P5) if Γ ` α then σ[Γ] ` σ(α), for every substitution σ of formulas for
variables.
As mentioned above, LFIs are paraconsistent logics enriched with a prim-
itive or defined consistency connective ◦ which allows recovering from the
explosion in a ‘controlled way’. Formally:
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Definition 9 Let L = 〈Θ,`〉 be a Tarskian, finitary and structural logic
defined over a propositional signature Θ, which contains a negation ¬, and
let ◦ be a (primitive or defined) unary connective. Then, L is a Logic of
Formal Inconsistency (LFI) with respect to ¬ and ◦ if the following holds:
(i) α,¬α 0 β for some α and β;
(ii) there are two formulas α and β such that
(ii.a) ◦α, α 0 β;
(ii.b) ◦α,¬α 0 β;
(iii) ◦α, α,¬α ` β for every α and β.
Note that condition (ii) of the definition of LFIs is required in order to satisfy
condition (iii) in a non-trivial way.
Remark 10 The definition of an LFI presented above, in which consistency
is defined by means of a single connective (Definition 9 above), is a simplified
version of the general definition of LFIs. In the general case, consistency can
be defined by means of a nonempty set of formulas (see [8, p. 21] and [7, p.
31-33]). However, Definition 9, although characterizing a particular case of
LFIs as defined in [9] (see also [8]), comprises all the logics studied in [8]
and [7], and also the logics called C-systems [9]. Actually, our definition of
LFI here is closer to the definition of C-system [8, p. 23]. It is worth noting
that the LFUs defined below, analogously, could be called D-systems.
The basic idea of LFIs may be extended: excluded middle may be re-
covered in paracomplete logics analogously to the way in which explosion is
recovered in LFIs.
Definition 11 Let L = 〈Θ,`〉 be a Tarskian, finitary and structural logic de-
fined over a propositional signature Θ, which contains a negation ¬. Assume
that L has a (primitive or defined) disjunction ∨ which enjoys the standard
property, namely: for every set of formulas Γ∪{α, β}, Cn(Γ∪{α})∩Cn(Γ∪
{β}) = Cn(Γ ∪ {α ∨ β}), where Cn(∆) def= {γ : ∆ ` γ}, for every ∆. Let
9 be a (primitive or defined) unary connective in Θ. Then, L is said to be
a Logic of Formal Undeterminedness (LFU) with respect to ¬ and 9 if the
following holds:
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(i) 0 α ∨ ¬α for some α;
(ii) there is a formula α such that
(ii.a) 9α 0 α;
(ii.b) 9α 0 ¬α;
(iii) 9α ` α ∨ ¬α for every α.
If ∨ and ∨′ are two disjunctions in L then α ∨ β and α ∨′ β are interderiv-
able, for every α and β. Thus, the definition of LFUs does not depend on a
particular choice of a (standard) disjunction in L. On the other hand, con-
dition (ii) is required in order to satisfy condition (iii) in a non-trivial way.
Notice, however, that disjunctions in Definition 11 could be completely dis-
pensed with, had we defined LFUs in the framework of multiple-conclusion
logics.
Remark 12 The concept of Logics of Formal Undeterminedness has been in-
troduced by Marcos in [31], but the idea of recovering excluded middle analo-
gously to how non-contradiction and explosion are recovered in Cn and LFIs,
as we have seen in Section 2.2, can be traced back to da Costa and Marconi
in [21]. Carnielli and Rodrigues in [12] presented a conceptual approach
to the duality, arguing that from an epistemic viewpoint paracomplete and
paraconsistent logics may be understood, respectively, as dealing with a no-
tion stronger and weaker than truth. Some ideas presented by Marcos in
[31] matches our interest in the duality between paraconsistency and para-
completeness, and we have tried to develop these ideas further in this paper
However, Marcos approaches the duality from a different viewpoint to ours:
he is concerned with paracomplete and paraconsistent negations defined in
modal terms, respectively, as _α def= 2∼α and ^α def= 3∼α [31, p.
292]. We have adopted the same symbols for consistency, inconsistency, de-
terminedness and undeterminedness connectives (respectively, ◦, •, 9 and 8)
[31, p. 290], but we do not define them in terms of other connectives because
we are interested mainly in ◦ and 9 as primitive recovery operators. As an
aside, it seems strange to us, though, why Marcos defines undeterminedness,
8α as α ∨_α, since determinedness, 9α, should be so defined.
Now, we combine the features of LFIs and LFUs to define a class of para-
complete and paraconsistent logics in which explosion and excluded middle
may be recovered, at once or one at a time.
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Definition 13 Let L = 〈Θ,`〉 be a Tarskian, finitary and structural logic
defined over a propositional signature Θ, which contains a negation ¬. As-
sume that L has a (primitive or defined) disjunction ∨ which is standard in
the sense of Definition 11. Let 9 and ◦ be two (primitive or defined, possibly
equal) unary connectives. Then, L is said to be a Logic of Formal Incon-
sistency and Undeterminedness (LFIU) with respect to ¬, 9 and ◦ if the
following holds:8
(i) α,¬α 0 β for some α and β;
(ii) 0 α ∨ ¬α for some α;
(iii) there is a formula α such that
(iii.a) 9α 0 α;
(iii.b) 9α 0 ¬α;
(iv) there are two formulas α and β such that
(iv.a) ◦α, α 0 β;
(iv.b) ◦α,¬α 0 β;
(v) For every formula α and β:
(v.a) 9α ` α ∨ ¬α;
(v.b) ◦α, α,¬α ` β.
If L is an LFIU such that 9α and ◦α are interderivable for every formula α
(and in particular if 9 = ◦), then L is said to be a strict LFIU.
As in the case of LFUs, the definition of LFIUs does not depend on
a particular choice of standard disjunction in L. On the other hand, condi-
tions (iii) and (iv) are required in order to satisfy condition (v) in a non-trivial
way.
Now, we define the basic LFIs, LFUs and LFIUs as extensions of clas-
sical positive logic. Following the usual presentation of LFIs, these systems
will be introduced by means of Hilbert calculi (below each one of these logics
L will be reintroduced by means of a sequent calculus LS).
8Logic systems with a negation simultaneously paraconsistent and paracomplete are
called paranormal by some authors.
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Definition 14 (Classical Positive Logic) The classical positive logic CPL+,
defined over the language For(Σ+), is obtained from intuitionistic positive
logic IPL+ (Definition 1) by adding the following axiom:(
α→ β) ∨ α (AX9 )
Definition 15 (Paraconsistent logic mbC) The logicmbC, defined over
the language For(Σ◦), is obtained from CPL+ by adding the following (see [9]):
α ∨ ¬α (AxPEM )
◦α→ (α→ (¬α→ β)) (GEXP)
As is well-known, the logic mbC is an LFI. It is paraconsistent and the
unary operator ◦ recovers explosion by means of the axiom GEXP (also called
‘gentle explosion principle’, tantamount here to EXP ◦). We now define a
paracomplete logic where the operator 9 recovers the excluded middle by
means of the axiom GPEM (‘gentle excluded middle’, tantamount here to
PEM9).
Definition 16 (The paracomplete logic mbD)
The logic mbD, defined over the language For(Σ9), is obtained from CPL+
by adding the following:
9α→ (α ∨ ¬α) (GPEM )
α→ (¬α→ β) (AxEXP)
Both properties of negation can be recovered simultaneously in a paracom-
plete and paraconsistent system which combines the previous ones:
Definition 17 (Paraconsistent and paracomplete logic mbCD)
The logicmbCD, defined over the language For(Σ~), is obtained from CPL+
by adding the following (see [11]):
~α→ (α ∨ ¬α) (GPEM )
~α→ (α→ (¬α→ β)) (GEXP)
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The logic mbCD is a strict LFIU based on CPL+, in which ~ can be
seen as a classicality operator, where ~α indicates that α behaves classically,
and so α obeys the laws of classical logic. Of course, the two properties of
classical negation mentioned in Definition 17 could be recovered separately
by means of a specific connective, that is, by means of a non-strict LFIU.
This motivates the following:
Definition 18 (Paraconsistent and paracomplete logic mbCDE)
The logic mbCDE, defined over the language For(Σ◦9), is obtained from
CPL+ by adding the following:
9α→ (α ∨ ¬α) (GPEM )
◦α→ (α→ (¬α→ β)) (GEXP)
Remark 19 In 1986 da Costa and Marconi introduced in [21] a hierarchy
Pn (for 1 ≤ n < ω) of paracomplete logics intended to be ‘dual’ to the hi-
erarchy Cn (for 1 ≤ n < ω) of paraconsistent logics (see Section 2, p. 9
above). Notice that this approach is analogous to mbD, and P1 and mbD
have the same relationship that holds between C1 and mbC. Additionally, in
1989 da Costa proposed in [19] a hierarchy Nn (for 1 ≤ n < ω) of paracon-
sistent and paracomplete logics based on CPL+, called ‘nonalethic’, intended
to simultaneously generalize the hierarchies Cn and Pn. The system N1, the
first logic of the Nn hierarchy, has some analogy with the system mbCDE.
In [19], the system obtained from N1 by adding the axiom schema α◦ is P1;
the system obtained from N1 by adding the axiom schema α∗ is C1; and the
system obtained from N1 by simultaneously adding the axiom schemas α◦ and
α∗ is CPL. These features are analogous to the ones described for mbCDE
in Remark 37 below. We could say that the relationship between N1 and
mbCDE is the same as the one between C1 and mbC and the one between
P1 and mbD.
Now, in order to emphasize the duality between their connectives and
rules, the same logics will be presented by means of sequent calculi. The
equivalence between both presentations will be obtained in Corollary 32 be-
low.
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Definition 20 (Sequent calculus for Classical Positive Logic)
Let CPL+S be the sequent calculus for classical positive propositional logic
CPL+ defined over the language For(Σ+) by the following rules:
α⇒ α Axiom
Γ⇒ ∆
α,Γ⇒ ∆ L-Weak
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, α R-Weak
α, α,Γ⇒ ∆
α,Γ⇒ ∆ L-Cont
Γ⇒ α, α,∆
Γ⇒ ∆, α R-Cont
α, β,Γ⇒ ∆
α ∧ β,Γ⇒ ∆ L∧
Γ⇒ α,∆ Γ⇒ β,∆
Γ⇒ α ∧ β,∆ R∧
Γ, α⇒ ∆ Γ, β ⇒ ∆
Γ, α ∨ β ⇒ ∆ L∨
Γ⇒ α, β,∆
Γ⇒ α ∨ β,∆ R∨
Γ⇒ ∆, α β,Γ⇒ ∆
α→ β,Γ⇒ ∆ L→
Γ, α⇒ β,∆
Γ⇒ α→ β,∆ R→
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ′, A⇒ ∆′
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′,∆ Cut
ConcerningmbC the following calculus was proposed by T. Rodrigues in [34]:
Definition 21 (Sequent calculus for mbC) LetmbCS be the sequent cal-
culus for mbC over the language For(Σ◦) defined by adding to CPL+S the
following rules:
◦α,Γ⇒ ∆, α
◦α,¬α,Γ⇒ ∆ L¬
◦ Γ, α⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬α,∆ R¬
Note that the rules L¬◦ and R¬ correspond to the axiomsGEXP and AxPEM
of Definition 15, respectively.
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Definition 22 (Sequent calculus for mbD) LetmbDS be the sequent cal-
culus for mbD over the language For(Σ9) defined by adding to CPL+S the
following rules:
Γ⇒ ∆, α
¬α,Γ⇒ ∆ L¬
Γ, 9α, α⇒ ∆
9α,Γ⇒ ¬α,∆ R¬9
Note that the rules L¬ and R¬9 correspond to the axioms AxEXP and
GPEM of Definition 16, respectively.
Definition 23 (Sequent calculus for mbCD) LetmbCDS be the sequent
calculus for mbCD defined over the language For(Σ~) defined by adding to
CPL+S the following rules:
~α,Γ⇒ ∆, α
~α,¬α,Γ⇒ ∆ L¬~
Γ,~α, α⇒ ∆
~α,Γ⇒ ¬α,∆ R¬~
Definition 24 (Sequent calculus for mbCDE) Let mbCDES be the se-
quent calculus for mbCDE defined over the language For(Σ◦9) defined by
adding to CPL+S the following rules:
◦α,Γ⇒ ∆, α
◦α,¬α,Γ⇒ ∆ L¬
◦ Γ, 9α, α⇒ ∆
9α,Γ⇒ ¬α,∆ R¬9
In order to deal with similar logics in an homogeneous way, we now define
the following collections of formal systems:
Definition 25
L def= {mbC,mbD,mbCD,mbCDE}
LS def=
{
mbCS,mbDS,mbCDS,mbCDES
}
L+ def= {CPL+,mbC,mbD,mbCD,mbCDE}
L+S def=
{
CPL+S ,mbCS,mbDS,mbCDS,mbCDES
}
.
Note that each L in L (resp. in L+) has a corresponding element LS in LS
(resp. in L+S ).
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4.1 Valuation semantics
As was done with several LFIs, in particular withmbC (see [8, 7]), valuation
semantics over
{
0, 1
}
are now defined so as to characterize the formal systems
presented in the previous section.
Definition 26 (Valuations)
(1) A function v : For(Σ+)→
{
0, 1
}
is a valuation for CPL+ and CPL+S if
it satisfies the following:
(vAnd) v(α ∧ β) = 1 ⇐⇒ v(α) = 1 and v(β) = 1
(vOr) v(α ∨ β) = 1 ⇐⇒ v(α) = 1 or v(β) = 1
(vImp) v(α→ β) = 1 ⇐⇒ v(α) = 0 or v(β) = 1
(2) A function v : For(Σ◦) →
{
0, 1
}
is a valuation for mbC and mbCS if
it satisfies the clauses for a CPL+-valuation, plus the following:
(vNeg) v(¬α) = 0 =⇒ v(α) = 1
(vCon) v(◦α) = 1 =⇒ (v(α) = 0 or v(¬α) = 0).
(3) A function v : For(Σ9)→
{
0, 1
}
is a valuation for mbD and mbDS, if
it satisfies the clauses for a CPL+-valuation, plus the following:
(vNegD) v(¬α) = 1 =⇒ v(α) = 0
(vConD) v(9α) = 1 =⇒ (v(α) = 1 or v(¬α) = 1).
(4) A function v : For(Σ~)→
{
0, 1
}
is a valuation formbCD andmbCDS,
if it satisfies the clauses for a CPL+-valuation, plus the following:
(vConCD) v(~α) = 1 =⇒ (v(α) = 1 iff v(¬α) = 0).
(5) A function v : For(Σ◦9) →
{
0, 1
}
is a valuation for mbCDE and
mbCDES, if it satisfies the clauses for a CPL+-valuation, plus the fol-
lowing:
(vConD) v(9α) = 1 =⇒ (v(α) = 1 or v(¬α) = 1)
(vCon) v(◦α) = 1 =⇒ (v(α) = 0 or v(¬α) = 0).
For every logic L ∈ L+ ∪ L+S (recall Definition 25) let `L and L be the
consequence relation of L w.r.t. derivations (in the corresponding calculus)
and w.r.t. its valuations, respectively. As specified in Definition 26, L = LS
23
for every L ∈ L+. To give a uniform treatment in the framework of Tarskian
logics, we define: Γ `LS ϕ iff the sequent Γ ⇒ ϕ is derivable in the sequent
calculus LS.
Theorem 27 (Soundness) Let L ∈ L+ ∪ L+S . For every set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of
formulas of L: Γ `L ϕ implies Γ L ϕ.
Proof. Straightforward. 2
As an immediate application of the soundness for each L, it is easy to prove
the following:
Proposition 28
(1) The logic mbD (resp. mbDS) is an LFU.
(2) The logic mbCD (resp. mbCDS) is a strict LFIU.
(3) The logic mbCDE (resp. mbCDES) is a non-strict LFIU.
Proof. (1) Let p be a propositional variable, and consider a valuation v for
mbD and mbDS such that v(p) = v(¬p) = 0. From this, 6|=mbD p ∨ ¬p and
so 0mbD p∨¬p and 0mbDS p∨¬p, by soundness. Now, let v′ be a valuation
for mbD such that v′(p) = 0 and v′(9p) = v′(¬p) = 1. Then 9p 6|=mbD p
and so 9p 6`mbD p and 9p 6`mbDS p, by soundness. Analogously it is shown
that 9p 6`mbD ¬p and 9p 6`mbDD ¬p. Finally, condition (iii) of Definition 11
follows by axiom (GPEM ) and (MP) (in the case of mbD) and from PEM9
that, as we have seen in Section 3, holds in mbDS. Items (2) and (3): the
proof is analogous, and is left to the reader. 2
In order to prove completeness, first it is necessary to recall some notions. A
set of formulas Γ of a (Tarskian) logic L is maximal relative to a formula α
in L if Γ 0L α, but Γ, β `L α whenever β 6∈ Γ. If Γ is maximal relative to
α in L then it is a closed theory in L, that is: Γ `L β iff β ∈ Γ, for every
formula β. Recall the following classical result:
Theorem 29 (Lindenbaum-Łos) Let L be a Tarskian and finitary logic
over a language For, and let Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ For such that Γ 0L α. Then there
exists a set ∆ such that Γ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ For and ∆ is maximal relative to α in L.
Proof. See [35, Theorem 22.2]. 2
The proof of the following result is straightforward:
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Proposition 30 Let L ∈ L+∪L+S , and let Γ be a set of formulas of L which
is maximal relative to a formula ϕ of L. Let α and β be formulas of L. Then:
(1) α ∧ β ∈ Γ iff α ∈ Γ and β ∈ Γ.
(2) α ∨ β ∈ Γ iff α ∈ Γ or β ∈ Γ.
(3) α→ β ∈ Γ iff α 6∈ Γ or β ∈ Γ.
(4) If L = mbC then:
(4.1) If ¬α 6∈ Γ then α ∈ Γ.
(4.2) If ◦α ∈ Γ then ¬α 6∈ Γ or α 6∈ Γ.
(5) If L = mbD then:
(5.1) If ¬α ∈ Γ then α 6∈ Γ.
(5.2) If 9α ∈ Γ then ¬α ∈ Γ or α ∈ Γ.
(6) If L = mbCD and ~α ∈ Γ then: ¬α ∈ Γ iff α 6∈ Γ.
(7) If L = mbCDE then:
(7.1) If 9α ∈ Γ then ¬α ∈ Γ or α ∈ Γ.
(7.2) If ◦α ∈ Γ then ¬α 6∈ Γ or α 6∈ Γ.
It is easy to see that every logic L ∈ L+ ∪ L+S is Tarskian, finitary and
structural (recall Definition 8). Thus, Theorem 29 holds for all of them and
so completeness follows easily:
Theorem 31 (Completeness) Let L ∈ L+ ∪L+S . For every set Γ∪{ϕ} of
formulas of L: Γ L ϕ implies Γ `L ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that Γ 0L ϕ, and let ∆ be a set of formulas of L such that
Γ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ is maximal relative to ϕ in L (Theorem 29). Let v be the
mapping from the set of formulas of L to
{
0, 1
}
defined as follows: v(ϕ) = 1
iff ϕ ∈ ∆, for every ϕ. By using Proposition 30, it is easy to see that v is a
valuation for L such that v[Γ] ⊆ {1} but v(ϕ) = 0. Thus Γ 2L ϕ. 2
Corollary 32 Let L ∈ L+. Then `L = `LS . That is, for every set Γ ∪ {ϕ}
of formulas of L: Γ `L ϕ iff Γ `LS ϕ.
4.2 A hierarchy based on stronger notions of consis-
tency
As we have said in Section 2, up to now the idea of a hierarchy of increas-
ingly weaker logics, proposed by da Costa, has not been as successful as
25
the introduction of an operator capable of expressing meta-logical notions
in the object language. This section proposes a hierarchy of logics based on
mbC, called mbCn (1 ≤ n < ω), in which consistency (i.e. the condition
for recovering explosion in mbCn) gets stronger as n grows up. It might be
instructive to make an analogy with tribunal systems in many countries, with
their own structure for dealing with cases and appeals. As we made clear,
the decision about consistency of a judgment is always performed outside the
formal system, and thus it becomes determined from outside whether ◦α is
true or not. This procedure may be regarded as being produced by a trial
court (or a district court). However, a second, higher level court, may decide
whether that mechanism is itself consistent, in the sense that it does not
produce ◦α and ¬ ◦ α. If so, this court establishes that ◦(◦α) is true. So it
may be that
◦α, α,¬α 0 β, while ◦◦α, ◦α, α,¬α ` β,
or in general, for ◦nα = ◦(◦n−1α),
◦nα, ◦n−1α, · · · , ◦1α, α,¬α 0 β, while ◦n+1α, ◦nα, · · · , ◦1α, α,¬α ` β.
The general case would correspond to a hierarchy of higher and higher level
courts, which might end up in a Kafkian chain of appellation courts in the
limit case – but of course, one may envisage practical situations in which two
or three levels could suffice. The idea is that it should be possible to express
degrees of consistency and to establish a point in which classical reasoning is
restored.
The simplest hierarchy may be obtained just by iterating the unary con-
sistency operator ◦. The hierarchymbCn is thus defined by replacing GEXP
(see Definition 15) with the axiom GEXP n (iterated gentle explosion prin-
ciple),
◦nα→ (◦n−1α→ · · · → (◦1α→ (α→ (¬α→ β) · · · ) (GEXP n)
for each n, where ◦nα = ◦(◦n−1α). In this case, there is only one connective
◦, that may be primitive or defined. As much as for mbC, each mbCn is an
LFI, and explosion is recovered by means of the axiom GEXP n. Note that
we need all the premises ◦nα, ◦n−1α, · · · , ◦1α because each statement of the
form ◦iβ is a guarantee that β will never be contradictory, but not that β is
asserted. In other words, a statement of the form ◦β is a negative stipulation,
or a clause which expressly prevents contradictions, not a positive utterance.
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Simple iteration, although illustrative, is not the only possible way to
formulate an axiomatization for mbCn. Alternatively, primitive or defined
connectives ◦1, ◦2, ◦3, · · · , ◦n may be conceived independently of each other.
They may express, for example, different and independent criteria that to-
gether constitute conclusive evidence for a proposition α. So, ◦1α, ◦2α, ◦3α, · · · ,
◦nα are, together, a sufficient condition and each ◦iα is a necessary condition
for establishing α conclusively, and the fact that the truth of α has been con-
clusively established is expressed by the validity of explosion w.r.t. α. In this
case, the premises could be represented by a set, }α = {◦1α, ◦2α, ◦3α, · · · ◦nα},
such that for any }α′ proper subset of }α,
}α′, α,¬α 0 β, while } α, α,¬α ` β.
Analogous approaches may be applied to mbD and mbCD, in order to pro-
duce hierarchies of determinedness and classicality, and the swap structures
semantics framework can also be adapted for those logics.
Remark 33 In [15], Ciuciura presents a hierarchy of LFIs called mbCn
(1 ≤ n < ω), in which the consistency operator ◦n of mbCn is given by
¬2α∧¬3α∧· · ·∧¬n+1α. Thus, ◦α = ◦1α def= ¬¬α expresses the consistency
operator in mbC1. Since the consistency operators ◦n are expressed in terms
of the others (namely, negation ¬ and conjunction ∧), these systems are
in fact dC-systems, a sub-class of LFIs as defined in [9, Subsection 3.8]
(see also [8, Definition 32] and [7, Section 3.3]). The author claims that
mbC1 “essentially coincides with mbC” ([15, pag. 174]). However, this
is not the case: just note that adding ¬¬α → α to mbC1 yields classical
logic CPL, while adding α → ¬¬α to mbC1 yields a logic which is not
really paraconsistent, that is, a logic controllably explosive w.r.t. the formula
schema ¬p0, i.e. ¬α,¬¬α ` β for every α and β (see [8, Definition 9]).
On the other hand, it is well-known that mbC can be expanded either by
¬¬α → α, by α → ¬¬α or by both without crashing into CPL or into a
controllably explosive logic. Moreover, in the abstract of [15] it is claimed that
the construction of the hierarchy mbCn “makes the connective of consistency
redundant”. Indeed, the consistency operator in mbCn is innocuous, since it
is a defined notion (as in da Costa’s Cn), but in general LFIs consistency
operators are by no means redundant.
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4.3 Recovering classical logic
Classical logic may be recovered in the logics of the family L (and so in the
family LS) in two ways: by defining a classical negation, and by means of a
derivability adjustment theorem (DAT ).
4.3.1 Defining classical negation
Recall, from the discussion after Remark 6, that a classical negation, in a
given sequent calculus, is a unary connective ∼ (primitive or defined) sat-
isfying the rules EXP and PEM (resp. L∼ and R∼, see Section 3). In a
Hilbert calculus, this is equivalent to saying that ∼ satisfies, respectively, the
schemas AxPEM and AxEXP (see Definitions 15 and 16).
Proposition 34 For L ∈ LS, a classical negation is definable in L.
Proof. In mbCS and mbCDES, define: ⊥ def= ◦α ∧ (α ∧ ¬α) for any
formula α. In mbCDS define: ⊥ def= ~α ∧ (α ∧ ¬α) for any formula α.
In mbDS, define: ⊥ def= α ∧ ¬α for any formula α. In L ∈ LS, define
∼α def= α→ ⊥. Now, we prove that
Γ⇒ ∆, α
∼α,Γ⇒ ∆ L∼ and
Γ, α⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∼α,∆ R∼
hold in L ∈ LS.
(i) L∼ holds in mbCS and mbCDES:
Γ⇒ ∆, α
Γ, ◦α, α,⇒ α,∆
Γ, ◦α, α,¬α⇒ ∆ L¬
◦
Γ, ◦α ∧ α ∧ ¬α⇒ ∆ L∧
Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆ Def⊥
α→ ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆ L→
(ii) L∼ holds in mbCDS: the proof is analogous to that given in item (i),
but now using the rules for ~.
(iii) L∼ holds in mbDS:
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Γ⇒ ∆, α
Γ, α,⇒ α,∆
Γ, α,¬α⇒ ∆ L¬
Γ, α ∧ ¬α⇒ ∆ L∧
Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆ Def⊥
α→ ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆ L→
(iv) R∼ holds in L ∈ LS.
Γ, α⇒ ∆
Γ, α⇒ ⊥,∆ R-Weak
Γ⇒ α→ ⊥,∆ R→
So, ∼ is a classical negation in L ∈ LS by the considerations given in Sec-
tion 3. 2
Remark 35 The logics here presented are said to be ‘minimal’ in the sense
that they have minimum resources to define a classical negation inside them.
This is the meaning of the ‘m’ in the names mbC, mbD etc. ‘bC’ and ‘bD’
mean, respectively, ‘basic property of consistency’ and ‘basic property of de-
terminedness’. Proposition 34 shows that all the logics studied here are able
to express every classical inference, as well as having additional resources to
deal with contradictory and incomplete scenarios. So, they may be seen as
extensions of classical logic. From this point of view, what is accomplished
by mbC, mbD, mbCD and mbCDE is nothing but adding resources to
classical logic in order to deal with paraconsistent and paracomplete scenar-
ios. Thus, although they reject some classical inferences w.r.t. inconsistent
and/or undetermined propositions, in fact, they are not weaker than classical
logic.
4.3.2 A derivability adjustment theorem – DAT
The basic idea of Derivability Adjustment Theorems (DATs) is that we have
to ‘add some information’ to the premises in order to restore the inferences
that are lacking. DAT s are especially interesting because they show what is
needed in order to restore classical consequence in non-classical contexts.
It will now be shown that CPL, classical propositional logic defined over
the signature ΣC (see Definition 2), can be recovered from mbD, mbCD
and mbCDE by adding a suitable set of hypothesis of the form 9α, ~α, or
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◦α and 9β in the case, respectively, of mbD, mbCD and mbCDE. This
result holds for the LFIs studied in [9, 8, 7] (including mbC).
Given a set of formulas ∆ let #∆ def= {#α : α ∈ ∆}, for # ∈ {◦, 9,~}.
Theorem 36 (DAT)
(1) Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas in For(ΣC). Then:
Γ `CPL α iff 9∆,Γ `mbD α for some ∆ ⊆ For(ΣC).
(2) Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas in For(ΣC). Then:
Γ `CPL α iff ~∆,Γ `mbCD α for some ∆ ⊆ For(ΣC).
(3) Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas in For(ΣC). Then:
Γ `CPL α iff ◦∆, 9∆′,Γ `mbCDE α for some ∆ ∪∆′ ⊆ For(ΣC).
Proof. (1) Suppose that Γ `CPL α. Observe that any derivation of α from
Γ in CPL can be seen as a derivation in CPL+ in which some instances of
axioms (AxPEM ) and (AxEXP) are (possibly) used as additional hypothesis.
Given a derivation α1 . . . αn = α of α from Γ in CPL, replace any instance
αi =
(
βi∨¬βi
)
of (AxPEM ) by the sequence
(
9βi →
(
βi∨¬βi
))
9βi
(
βi∨¬βi
)
.
The resulting sequence of formulas is a derivation in mbD of α from Γ∪9∆,
where 9∆ is the set of formulas of the form 9βi added by the process described
above. Observe that every βi is in For(ΣC).
Now, assume that 9∆,Γ `mbD α for some ∆ ⊆ For(ΣC). Then, by
Theorem 27 it follows that 9∆,Γ |=mbD α. Let v be a valuation for CPL over
ΣC such that v[Γ] ⊆ {1}, and extend v to a maping v′ : For(Σ9) →
{
0, 1
}
by defining v′(9β) = 1 for every β ∈ For(Σ9). Then, v′ is a valuation for
mbD such that v′[Γ ∪ 9∆] ⊆ {1} and so v′(α) = 1. But v′ extends v, thus
v(α) = 1. Hence, Γ |=CPL α. By completeness of CPL w.r.t. valuations it
follows that Γ `CPL α.
(2) ‘Only if’ part: it is proven analogously to item (1). However, besides
processing the instances αi =
(
βi∨¬βi
)
of (AxPEM ) as described in item (1)
(but now using the connective ~), any instance αk =
(
δk →
(¬δk → γk))
of (AxEXP) must be replaced by
(
~δk →
(
δk →
(¬δk → γk)))~δk(δk →(¬δk → γk)), and the set ~∆ must also include occurrences of formulas of
the form ~δk introduced in this way. Once again, observe that every δk is in
For(ΣC). The ‘If’ part is proved analogously to item (1).
(3) It is proved in a similar way. The details are left to the reader.
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Remark 37 Theorem 36 above shows that CPL can be recovered inside any
of the systems mbD, mbCD and mbCDE by adding an appropriate set of
premises. Moreover, by adding 9α (resp. ~α) as a schema axiom in the
case of mbD (resp. mbCD), the logic collapses to CPLe , the presentation
of CPL over signature Σ9 (resp. Σ~) obtained by adding 9α (resp. ~α)
as a schema axiom. In the case of mbCDE, there are three possibilities:
by adding 9α as a schema axiom mbC e is obtained, a presentation of mbC
over Σ◦9; by adding ◦α as a schema axiom mbDe is obtained, a presenta-
tion of mbD over Σ◦9; and finally, by adding both ◦α and 9α as schema
axioms CPL◦9e is obtained, a presentation of CPL over signature Σ◦9 in
which both ◦α and 9α are top particles. Compare these features of mbCDE
with the ones enjoyed by da Costa’s paraconsistent and paracomplete logic N1
described briefly in Remark 19.
4.4 The inconsistency and the undeterminedness oper-
ators
As remarked in Section 3, the inconsistency operator • and the undeter-
minedness operator 8 may be defined from ◦ and 9 when a classical negation
is available. So, • and 8 can be defined in mbC, mbD and mbCDE, since
a classical negation is definable in these systems (see Proposition 34):
•α def= ∼◦α,
8α
def
= ∼9α.
Proposition 38 The rules below hold in mbC, mbD and mbCDE:
Γ, ◦α⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ •α,∆
Γ⇒ •α,∆
Γ, ◦α⇒ ∆
Γ, 9α⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ 8α,∆
Γ⇒ 8α,∆
Γ, 9α⇒ ∆
Proof. Directly from the definitions of 8, •, and the rules L∼ and R∼. 2
Now, rules for • and 8 can be obtained from L¬◦ and R¬9:
Γ⇒ ∆, α, •α
¬α,Γ⇒ •α,∆ L¬
•,
Γ, α⇒ 8α,∆
Γ⇒ ¬α, 8α,∆ R¬
8,
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and semantic clauses for • and 8 are as follows:
(vInc)
(
v(α) = 1 and v(¬α) = 1) =⇒ v(•α) = 1,
(vUnd)
(
v(α) = 0 and v(¬α) = 0) =⇒ v(8α) = 1.
The clause (vInc) says that v(•α) = 1 is only a necessary condition for
v(α) = v(¬α) = 1: if the latter holds, the former has to hold. On the
other hand, it may be that α is not contradictory (i.e. it is not the case
that v(α) = v(¬α) = 1) but •α holds. Thus, w.r.t. α, we may say that •α
means that a contradiction is permitted, while ◦α means that a contradiction
is prohibited (i.e. not permited). This reading is in accordance with the
fact that •α is the classical negation of ◦α, and the clause (vInc) is the
contrapositive of (vCon).
Analogously, the clause (vUnd) says that v(8α) = 1 is only a necessary
condition for v(α) = v(¬α) = 0: it cannot be that the latter holds but
v(8α) = 0. On the other hand, it may be that v(α) = 1 or v(¬α) = 1
(i.e. α ∨ ¬α holds) but v(8α) = 1 (i.e 8α still holds). Thus, w.r.t. α, we
may understand 8α as meaning that undeterminedness is permitted, while
9α means that undeterminedness is prohibited (i.e. not permitted). This
reading, in its turn, is in accordance with the fact that 8α is the classical
negation of 9α, and the clause (vUnd) is the contrapositive of (vConD).
4.5 Back to duality
The basic idea of duality for classical propositional connectives, expressed
by Definition 4, is that the connectives are functions from {0, 1} to {0, 1}
such that, when the inputs are inverted, the outputs are also inverted. Thus
classical ∧ and ∨ are dual, because they correspond, respectively, to the
following functions:
∧ = {〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 0, 0〉}
∨ = {〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 1〉}.
This idea can be extended to the non-truth-functional connectives of mbC
and mbD. Let us use the symbol ¬c to refer to the negation of mbC. The
paraconsistent negation ¬c is not functional, in the sense that the semantic
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value of ¬cα is not functionally determined by the semantic value of α: when
v(α) = 1, v(¬cα) may be 0 or 1. So, ¬c is represented by the relation below:
¬c = {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉}.
The paracomplete negation ofmbD, referred to by ¬d, in turn, is represented
by the relation
¬d = {〈1, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈0, 0〉}.
The idea that inverted inputs yield inverted outputs is maintained, we just
do not have ‘truth-functionality’ any more, but the connectives are repre-
sented by non-functional relations. The idea of considering truth-relations
instead of truth-functions for dealing with non-truth-functional connectives
can be traced back to Fidel. Indeed, Fidel, in 1977, introduced an algebraic-
relational kind of structure for da Costa’s systems Cn in [22] in which the
paraconsistent negation is interpreted by means of relations. As far as we
know, for the first time Fidel proved the decidability of the logics of Cn
hierarchy. Such structures are now called Fidel structures or F-structures,
after Odintsov (see [32]). As proven in [7, Chapter 6], there is a close rela-
tionship between F-structures and a semantics of multialgebras called swap
structures, which will be analyzed in Section 5.
The next definition formalizes these intuitions:
Definition 39 Let κ1 and κ2 be n-ary connectives semantically character-
ized by valuation semantics over {0, 1} expressed by the (non-necessarily func-
tional) relations R1 and R2, respectively. Let Inv be the operation over {0, 1}
such that Inv(1) = 0 and Inv(0) = 1. We say that κ1 and κ2 are dual just
in case:
〈x1, x2, ..., xn, y〉 ∈ R1 iff 〈Inv(x1), Inv(x2), ..., Inv(xn), Inv(y)〉 ∈ R2.
Given convenient valuation semantics, the definition above allows the com-
parison of connectives from different logics.9 Let us take a look at the connec-
tives ◦, 9, •, 8, in mbC and mbD. Although from the syntactic viewpoint
9As far as we know, the notion of dual connectives defined here by means of non-
functional relations on {0, 1} has not yet been regarded in the literature. Note that the
operation Inv is not applied to the relations, but rather to the elements of the n-tuples. We
could define a notion of dual relation giving birth to different notions of duality between
connectives. Of course, general cases of triality, quaternality or in general k-ality, can
be also defined, even for n-valued logics, by using cyclic groups as in [5]. This is being
investigated elsewhere.
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these connectives are unary, they have to be represented by ternary relations,
since the value of ∗α, ∗ ∈ {◦, 9, •, 8}, depends on the values of α and ¬α.
So, for instance, in mbC,
◦ = {〈1, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉},
and in mbD,
8 = {〈0, 0, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉}.
The idea of considering triples (called snapshots) (z1, z2, z3) in which z1, z2
and z3 represent the truth-value of α, ¬α and ◦α, respectively, is the starting
point of the swap-structures semantics for LFIs, to be analyzed in Section 5.
Proposition 40 The following connectives are dual to each other: ◦ ofmbC
and 8 of mbD; • of mbC and 9 of mbD; ¬ of mbC and ¬ of mbD.
Proof. Straightforward, from Definition 39. 2
Remark 41
I. An important feature of the notion of duality as defined by Defini-
tion 39, and differently from Definition 4, is that given a connective ∗
and its dual ∗d, being ∼ classical negation, it may be that ∗α and ∼∗d∼α
are not materially equivalent. Indeed, neither ◦α and ∼8∼α, nor 9α
and ∼•∼α, are equivalent in mbCDE – in order to see this, consider
the mbCDE-valuation v(α) = 1, v(¬α) = 0, v(∼α) = 0, v(¬∼α) = 1.
In this valuation, it may be that v(◦α) = 1 and v(8∼α) = 1. In this
case v(∼8∼α) = 0, and the equivalence between ◦α and ∼8∼α does not
hold (mutatis mutandis for 9α and ∼•∼α). This happens because, as
we have just seen above, these connectives are not functions but rather
relations. So, the connectives ◦, •, 9 and 8 are not interdefinable in
the sense that, for example, 9α cannot be defined as ◦∼α (the pairs ◦
and •, as well as 9 and 8 are, of course, interdefinable).
II. The Square of Oppositions proposed by Marcos in [31] for the connec-
tives ◦, •, 9 and 8 defined in modal terms (pp. 291-292) does not hold
for these connectives in any of the logics studied here (note that in [31,
p. 291], if 8 means undeterminedness, 9p and 8p should have their
positions exchanged). In mbCDE, for example, the pairs 8α and •α
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are not contraries, nor subcontraries, since they may simultaneously
receive value 1 (or true), as well as value 0 (or false), for example,
when v(α) = 1 and v(¬α) = 0 (ditto for 9α and ◦α). This is in accor-
dance with the intuitive reading of the connectives proposed in page 32
above: ◦α, •α, 9α and 8α mean, respectively, that, w.r.t. to α, a con-
tradiction is prohibited, a contradiction is permitted, undeterminedness
is prohibited and undeterminedness is permitted.
4.5.1 Duality in mbCD and mbCDE
In the logic mbCDE that contains the four connectives, all the dualities
mentioned above hold, and the negation ¬ is dual to itself.
The logic mbCD collapses the connectives ◦ and 9 into ~ in order to
recover excluded middle and explosion at once. The classical negation of ~
in mbCD produces a connective :α def= ∼~α governed by the rules
Γ⇒ ∆, :α, α
¬α,Γ⇒ :α,∆ L¬
:,
Γ, α⇒ :α,∆
Γ⇒ :α,¬α,∆ R¬
:,
and the associated semantic clause
(vNcla)
(
v(α) = 1 and v(¬α) = 1) or (v(α) = 0 and v(¬α) = 0) =⇒
v(:α) = 1.
As mentioned after Definition 17, in mbCD the connective ~ may be
understood as a classicality operator. So, in mbCD, : may be interpreted as
a non-classicality operator in the sense that :α is a consequence of α being
either contradictory or undetermined: according to the clause vNcla, :α is a
necessary condition for either v(α) = v(¬α) = 1 or v(α) = v(¬α) = 0.
The connectives ~, : and the negation ¬ are represented in mbCD by
the relations below:
~ = {〈1, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉},
: = {〈0, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉},
¬ = {〈0, 1〉, 〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉}.
So, in mbCD the negation ¬ is the dual of itself, and ~ and : are dual of
each other.
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The examples presented in this section about dual connectives, repre-
sented as relations, suggest an interesting topic for future research. More-
over, the framework of Fidel structures seems to be suitable for dealing with
such notions.
5 Swap structures
As it is well-known, most of the LFIs studied in the literature are not alge-
braizable by means of the usual techniques such as the general framework of
Blok and Pigozzi (see [3]). Moreover, most LFIs are not even characterizable
by a single logical matrix. This justifies the search of alternative semantics
for these logics, such as possible-translation semantics, Fidel structures and
Nmatrices.
The notion of swap structures formbC, as well as for some LFIs axiomat-
ically extending mbC, was introduced in [7, Chapter 6]. Swap structures for
LFIs are multialgebras B formed by triples (called snapshots) over a given
Boolean algebra A, where each triple (z1, z2, z3) corresponds to a (complex)
truth-value in which z1 represents the truth-value of a formula α, while z2
and z3 represent a possible truth-value for ¬α and ◦α, respectively. The
possibilities of swap structures semantics lie beyond the scope of LFIs. For
instance, in [14] and [24, Chapter 3] swap structures were defined as a seman-
tical counterpart for some non-normal modal logics, where the snapshots are
triples (z1, z2, z3) in which z1, z2 and z3 represent the truth-value of formulas
α, α and ∼α, respectively.
Given a swap structure B for a given logic L, it originates a non-deter-
ministic matrix (in the sense of Avron and Lev, see for instance [1]) such that
the class of such Nmatrices semantically characterizes L. In this section, this
technique (which was additionally developed from the algebraic point of view
in [13]) will be used in order to semantically characterize the logics mbD,
mbCD and mbCDE (in the latter, snapshots will be quadruples instead of
triples). Moreover, a decision procedure will be obtained for such logics from
this semantics. Recall the following:
Definition 42 An implicative lattice is an algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,→〉 for Σ+
where 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice such that ∨{c ∈ A : a ∧ c ≤ b} exists for every
a, b ∈ A, and → is an implication defined as follows: a→ b def= ∨{c ∈ A :
a∧ c ≤ b} for every a, b ∈ A (observe that 1 def= a→ a is the top element of
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A, for any a ∈ A). If, additionally, a ∨ (a→ b) = 1 for every a, b then A is
said to be a classical implicative lattice.10
It is well-known that, if A is a classical implicative lattice and it has
a bottom element 0, then it is a Boolean algebra. An algebraic semantics
for CPL+ is given by classical implicative lattices. That is, Γ `CPL+ α iff,
for every classical implicative lattice A and for every homomorphism v from
For(Σ+) to A, if v(γ) = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ then v(α) = 1.
Let A = 〈A,∧,∨,→, 0, 1〉 be a Boolean algebra. Let pij : A3 → A be
the canonical projections, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. Hence, if z ∈ A3 and zj = pij(z)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 then z = (z1, z2, z3). Analogously, if z ∈ A4 then we write
z = (z1, z2, z3, z4), where zj denotes the jth projection of z.
Definition 43 Let A be a Boolean algebra with domain A.
(1) The universe of the swap structures for mbD over A is the set
BmbDA = {z ∈ A3 : z1 ∧ z2 = 0 and z3 → ( z1 ∨ z2) = 1}.
(2) The universe of the swap structures for mbCD over A is the set11
BmbCDA = {z ∈ A3 : z3 ∧ ( z1 ∧ z2) = 0 and z3 → ( z1 ∨ z2) = 1}
= {z ∈ A3 : z3 ≤ ( z1 ∨ z2) ∧ ∼( z1 ∧ z2)}.
(3) The universe of the swap structures for mbCDE over A is the set
BmbCDEA = {z ∈ A4 : z3 ∧ ( z1 ∧ z2) = 0 and z4 → ( z1 ∨ z2) = 1}.
Definition 44 Let A = 〈A,∧,∨,→, 0, 1〉 be a Boolean algebra.
(1) A multialgebra B = 〈B,∧B,∨B,→B,¬B, 9B〉 over Σ9 is a swap structure
for mbD over A if B ⊆ BmbDA and the following holds, for every z and w in
B:
(i) ∅ 6= z#Bw ⊆ {u ∈ B : u1 = z1#w1}, for each # ∈ {∧,∨,→};
(ii) ∅ 6= ¬B(z) ⊆ {u ∈ B : u1 = z2};
(iii) ∅ 6= 9B(z) ⊆ {u ∈ B : u1 = z3}.
10The name was taken from H. Curry, see [16].
11Here, ∼ denotes the Boolean complement in A.
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(2) A multialgebra B = 〈B,∧B,∨B,→B,¬B,~B〉 over Σ~ is a swap structure
for mbCD over A if B ⊆ BmbCDA , the multioperations #B, are defined as in
item (1) (for # ∈ {∧,∨,→,¬}) and, for every z in B:
(iii) ∅ 6= ~B(z) ⊆ {u ∈ B : u1 = z3}.
(3) A multialgebra B = 〈B,∧B,∨B,→B,¬B, ◦B, 9B〉 over Σ◦9 is a swap struc-
ture formbCDE overA if B ⊆ BmbCDEA , the multioperations #B, are defined
as in item (1) (for # ∈ {∧,∨,→,¬, ◦}) and, for every z in B:
(iv) ∅ 6= 9B(z) ⊆ {u ∈ B : u1 = z4}.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, each snapshot (z1, z2, z3)
in a swap structure for mbD can be seen as a kind of complex truth-value
such that z1 encodes the truth-value of a formula α, while z2 and z3 encode
a possible truth-value for ¬α and 9α, respectively. The snapshots of swap
structures for mbCD have a similar interpretation, but now z3 represents a
possible truth-value for ~α. In the case ofmbCDE, a snapshot (z1, z2, z3, z4)
is such that z1 represents the truth-value of a formula α, while z2, z3 and z4
encode a truth-value for ¬α, ◦α and 9α, respectively.
From now on, the subscript ‘B’ will be omitted when referring to the
multioperations of B.
Definition 45 Let A be a Boolean algebra and L ∈ {mbD,mbCD,mbCDE}.
There is a unique swap structure BLA for L with domain BLA such that ‘⊆’ is
replaced by ‘=’ in Definition 44.
As a consequence of Definition 45, the multioperations in each swap structure
BLA are defined as follows:
(i) z#w = {u ∈ BLA : u1 = z1#w1}, for each # ∈ {∧,∨,→} and each L;
(ii) ¬(z) = {u ∈ BLA : u1 = z2}, for each L.
On the other hand:
(i) 9(z) = {u ∈ BmbDA : u1 = z3}, for mbD;
(ii) ~(z) = {u ∈ BmbCDA : u1 = z3}, for mbCD;
(iii) ◦(z) = {u ∈ BmbCDEA : u1 = z3}, for mbCDE;
(iii) 9(z) = {u ∈ BmbCDEA : u1 = z4}, for mbCDE.
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6 From swap structures to Nmatrix semantics
In this section L will denote any logic in
{
mbD,mbCD,mbCDE
}
. Re-
call the semantics associated to Nmatrices introduced by Avron and Lev
[2]. For each L as above, let KL be the class of swap structures for L. By
adapting what was done in [7, Chapter 6] for several LFIs, as well as the
techiques introduced in [13], it will be shown that each B ∈ KL induces a
non-deterministic matrix such that the class of such Nmatrices semantically
characterizes L.
Definition 46 For each B ∈ KL let DB = {z ∈ |B| : z1 = 1}. The Nmatrix
associated to B isM(B) = (B, DB). Let
Mat
(
KL
)
=
{M(B) : B ∈ KL}.
Using the definition of valuation semantics over Nmatrices introduced
in [2], the following valuation semantics can be associated to each class of
Nmatrices considered above:
Definition 47 Let B ∈ KL andM(B) as above. A valuation overM(B) is
a function v from the set of formulas of L to |B| such that, for every formula
α and β:
(i) v(α#β) ∈ v(α)#v(β), for every # ∈ {∧,∨,→};
(ii) v(¬α) ∈ ¬v(α);
(iii) v(9α) ∈ 9v(α), if L ∈ {mbD,mbCDE};
(iii) v(◦α) ∈ ◦v(α), if L = mbCDE;
(iv) v(~α) ∈ ~v(α), if L = mbCD.
Definition 48 Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas of L.
(1) We say that α is a consequence of Γ in M(B) ∈ Mat(KL), denoted
by Γ |=M(B) α, if v(α) ∈ DB for every valuation v over M(B) such that
v(γ) ∈ DB for every γ ∈ Γ.
(2) We say that α is a consequence of Γ in the class Mat
(
KL
)
of Nmatrices,
denoted by Γ |=Mat(KL) α, if Γ |=M(B) α for everyM(B) ∈Mat
(
KL
)
.
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Theorem 49 (Soundness of L w.r.t. swap structures) Let Γ ∪ {α} be
a set of formulas of L. Then: Γ `L α implies Γ |=Mat(KL) α.
Proof. It is an easy consequence of the definitions and of the fact that
CPL+ is sound w.r.t. classical implicative lattices (and so w.r.t. Boolean
algebras). Details are left to the reader (for swap structures for LFIs see [7,
Chapter 6] and [13]). 2
In order to prove completeness, the technique introduced in [14] (see also [24,
13]) for constructing a Lindenbaum-Tarski multialgebra together with a canon-
ical valuation will be adapted here.
Let Γ be a non-trivial theory in L. An equivalence relation ≡LΓ in the set
ForL of formulas of L is defined as follows: α ≡LΓ β iff Γ `L α → β and
Γ `L β → α. Clearly, ≡LΓ is a congruence w.r.t. the connectives of CPL+ and
so the quotient set ForL/≡LΓ is a classical implicative lattice with top element
1LΓ
def
= [p1 → p1]LΓ (here, [α]LΓ denotes the equivalence class of α w.r.t. ≡LΓ).
Moreover, 0LΓ
def
= [p1 ∧ ¬p1]LΓ (for L = mbD); 0LΓ def= [◦p1 ∧ (p1 ∧ ¬p1)]LΓ
(for L = mbCDE); and 0LΓ
def
= [~p1 ∧ (p1 ∧ ¬p1)]LΓ (for L = mbCD) is the
bottom element of ForL/≡LΓ . Thus, ALΓ
def
=
〈
ForL/≡LΓ ,∧,∨,→, 0LΓ , 1LΓ
〉
is a
Boolean algebra (details are left to the reader).
Definition 50 Let Γ be a non-trivial theory in L. The Lindenbaum-Tarski
swap structure for L (over Γ) is the swap structure BLALΓ defined over the
Boolean algebra ALΓ (see Definition 45). The associated Nmatrix is denoted
byMLΓ.
Definition 51 The canonical valuation vLΓ overMLΓ is defined as follows:
(i) vLΓ (α)
def
=
(
[α]LΓ , [¬α]LΓ , [9α]LΓ
)
, for L = mbD;
(ii) vLΓ (α)
def
=
(
[α]LΓ , [¬α]LΓ , [~α]LΓ
)
, for L = mbCD;
(ii) vLΓ (α)
def
=
(
[α]LΓ , [¬α]LΓ , [◦α]LΓ , [9α]LΓ
)
for L = mbCDE.
It can be proved that vLΓ is indeed a valuation overMLΓ such that, by the
very definitions, vLΓ (α) is designated iff Γ `L α.
The Lindenbaum-Tarski swap structure together with the canonical val-
uation allows us to prove the completeness of L w.r.t. swap structures in a
straightforward way:
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Theorem 52 (Completeness of L w.r.t. swap structures) Let Γ∪{α}
be a set of formulas of L. Then: Γ |=Mat(KL) α implies Γ `L α.
Proof. Suppose that Γ 0L α. Then,MLΓ (see Definition 50) is an Nmatrix for
L, and the canonical valuation vLΓ (see Definition 51) is a valuation overMLΓ
such that vLΓ (γ) is designated, for every γ ∈ Γ, but vLΓ (α) is not designated.
From this, Γ 6|=Mat(KL) α.
2
7 Decidability by finite Nmatrices
As it happens with several LFIs and other logics characterized by swap struc-
tures defined over Boolean algebras (see [7, 13, 14, 24]), the swap structure
BLA2 with domain BLA2 over the 2-element Boolean algebra A2 (with domain{
0, 1
}
) is enough to characterize the logics L ∈ {mbD,mbCD,mbCDE}.
This produces a decision procedure for each L by means of a finite Nmatrix,
thanks to the semantical characterization of these logics through valuations
(recall Section 4.1).
From definitions 43 and 44, the special case for A2 produces, for mbD,
a universe BmbDA2 =
{
T, t0, F, f0, f
}
such that T = (1, 0, 1), t0 = (1, 0, 0),
F = (0, 1, 1), f0 = (0, 1, 0), and f = (0, 0, 0). The set of designated elements
of the NmatrixMmbDA2 =M
(BmbDA2 ) is D = {T, t0}, while ND = {F, f0, f}
is the set of non-designated truth-values. The multioperations are defined as
follows:
∧ T t0 F f0 f
T D D ND ND ND
t0 D D ND ND ND
F ND ND ND ND ND
f0 ND ND ND ND ND
f ND ND ND ND ND
∨ T t0 F f0 f
T D D D D D
t0 D D D D D
F D D ND ND ND
f0 D D ND ND ND
f D D ND ND ND
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→ T t0 F f0 f
T D D ND ND ND
t0 D D ND ND ND
F D D D D D
f0 D D D D D
f D D D D D
¬
T ND
t0 ND
F D
f0 D
f ND
9
T D
t0 ND
F D
f0 ND
f ND
Theorem 53 (Characterization of mbD by a finite Nmatrix)
For every set of formulas Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ For(Σ9): Γ `mbD α iff Γ |=MmbDA2 α.
Proof.
The ‘only if’ part (soundness) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 49.
The ‘if’ part (completeness) follows by the following:
Fact: For every valuation v for mbD (see Definition 26) the mapping vmbD :
For(Σ9) → BmbDA2 given by vmbD(α) = (v(α), v(¬α), v(9α)) is a valuation
over the Nmatrix MmbDA2 such that: vmbD(α) ∈ D iff v(α) = 1, for every
formula α.
The proof of the Fact is analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.4.9 in [7], and
is left to the reader. From this the result follows in a straightforward way. 2
Clearly, the 5-valued Nmatrix MmbDA2 provides a decision procedure for
mbD. Note that the negation of mbD is explosive and paracomplete, in the
sense that excluded middle is not valid (because of the behavior of f in the
table of ¬.).
Concerning the logic mbCD, the algebra A2 gives origin to a universe
BmbCDA2 =
{
T, t0, t, F, f0, f
}
such that T, t0, F, f0 and f are as above, and
t = (1, 1, 0). The set of designated elements of the Nmatrix MmbCDA2 =M(BmbCDA2 ) is D’ = {T, t0, t}, while ND = {F, f0, f} is the set of non-
designated truth-values. The multioperations are defined as follows:
∧ T t0 t F f0 f
T D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
t0 D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
t D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
F ND ND ND ND ND ND
f0 ND ND ND ND ND ND
f ND ND ND ND ND ND
∨ T t0 t F f0 f
T D’ D’ D’ D’ D’ D’
t0 D’ D’ D’ D’ D’ D’
F D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
f0 D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
f D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
42
→ T t0 t F f0 f
T D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
t0 D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
t D’ D’ D’ ND ND ND
F D’ D’ D’ D’ D’ D’
f0 D’ D’ D’ D’ D’ D’
f D’ D’ D’ D’ D’ D’
¬
T ND
t0 ND
t D’
F D’
f0 D’
f ND
~
T D’
t0 ND
t ND
F D’
f0 ND
f ND
The following result can be proved in a similar way to the proof of The-
orem 53:
Theorem 54 (Characterization of mbCD by a finite Nmatrix)
For every set of formulas Γ∪{α} ⊆ For(Σ~): Γ `mbCD α iff Γ |=MmbCDA2 α.
The 6-valued NmatrixMmbCDA2 provides a decision procedure formbCD.
Note that the negation of mbCD is both paraconsistent and paracomplete,
respectively because of the behavior of t and the behavior of f in the table
of ¬.
Finally the logic mbCDE will be analyzed. The algebra A2 produces
a universe BmbCDEA2 =
{
T 1, T 0, t10, t
0
0, t
1, t0, F 1, F 0, f 10 , f
0
0 , f
01, f 0
}
such
that T 1 = (1, 0, 1, 1), T 0 = (1, 0, 1, 0), t10 = (1, 0, 0, 1), t00 = (1, 0, 0, 0),
t1 = (1, 1, 0, 1), t0 = (1, 1, 0, 0), F 1 = (0, 1, 1, 1), F 0 = (0, 1, 1, 0), f 10 =
(0, 1, 0, 1), f 00 = (0, 1, 0, 0), f 01 = (0, 0, 1, 0), f 0 = (0, 0, 0, 0). The set of
designated truth-values of the Nmatrix MmbCDEA2 = M
(BmbCDEA2 ) is D” ={
T 1, T 0, t10, t
0
0, t
1, t0
}
, and ND’ =
{
F 1, F 0, f 10 , f
0
0 , f
01, f 0
}
is the set of
non-designated truth-values. The multioperations are defined as follows:
∧ T 1 T 0 t10 t00 t1 t0 F 1 F 0 f10 f00 f01 f0
T 1 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
T 0 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t10 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t00 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t1 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t0 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
F 1 ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
F 0 ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f10 ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f00 ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f01 ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f0 ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
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∨ T 1 T 0 t10 t00 t1 t0 F 1 F 0 f10 f00 f01 f0
T 1 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
T 0 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
t10 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
t00 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
t1 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
t0 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
F 1 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
F 0 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f10 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f00 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f01 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
f0 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
→ T 1 T 0 t10 t00 t1 t0 F 1 F 0 f10 f00 f01 f0
T 1 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
T 0 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t10 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t00 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t1 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
t0 D” D” D” D” D” D” ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’ ND’
F 1 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
F 0 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
f10 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
f00 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
f01 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
f0 D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D” D”
¬
T 1 ND’
T 0 ND’
t10 ND’
t00 ND’
t1 D”
t0 D”
F 1 D”
F 0 D”
f10 D”
f00 D”
f01 ND’
f0 ND’
◦
T 1 D”
T 0 D”
t10 ND’
t00 ND’
t1 ND’
t0 ND’
F 1 D”
F 0 D”
f10 ND’
f00 ND’
f01 D”
f0 ND’
9
T 1 D”
T 0 ND’
t10 D”
t00 ND’
t1 D”
t0 ND’
F 1 D”
F 0 ND’
f10 D”
f00 ND’
f01 ND’
f0 ND’
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As in the previous cases, the following result can be easily proved:
Theorem 55 (Characterization of mbCDE by a finite Nmatrix)
For every set of formulas Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ For(Σ◦9):
Γ `mbCDE α iff Γ |=MmbCDEA2 α.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that for Theorem 53, with the follow-
ing change: given a valuation v for mbCDE (see Definition 26), it induces
a valuation vmbCDE over the Nmatrix MmbCDEA2 as follows: vmbCDE(α) =
(v(α), v(¬α), v(◦α), v(9α)). 2
The 12-valued Nmatrix MmbCDEA2 constitutes a decision procedure for
mbCDE. As in the case of mbCD, the negation of mbCDE is both para-
consistent (because of t1 and t0) and paracomplete (because of f 01 and f 0).
8 Final remarks
We have seen here how two foundational ideas of paraconsistency may be de-
veloped further: the duality between paraconsistency and paracompleteness,
and the introduction of logical operators that express meta-logical notions
in the object language. The idea of da Costa’s well-behavedness operator
has been further developed by the consistency operator of LFIs. The later,
in its turn, has given rise to the more general concept of recovery operators,
represented here by the unary operators ◦, 9, and ~. Not only explosion
but also excluded middle may be recovered inside systems in which they are
not, in general, valid. The connectives ◦ and 9 may be combined in order
to recover classical logic at once, and so the combined operator ~ may be
called a classicality operator. Actually, it is fair to say that a whole path
has been opened by the concept of ‘logics of formal N’, where the wildcard
symbol N marks a space to be fulfilled by some logical property that we want
to restrict and control inside a formal system.
Additionally, we have already seen how a hierarchy of logics may be con-
structed in order to represent the degrees whereby the logical properties
represented in object language are controlled. We may, for instance, repre-
sent levels of consistency, and establish the point in which the consistency
of a proposition α is enough to recover explosion. The same idea may be
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extended to determinedness, classicality, and in principle to any other logical
property restricted/controlled by means of a recovery operator in an LFN.
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 5, most of the LFIs introduced
in the literature are not algebraizable by the usual tecnhiques, and so several
alternatives were proposed in the literature, as for instance possible trans-
lations semantics (see [7, Secs. 4.3 and 6.8]). Swap structures semantics
constitutes a simple and fruitful approach to algebraizability in a broader
sense, by considering non-deterministic algebras instead of ordinary algebras
(see [6], and [13] for recent algebraic developments on swap structures). The
question of algebraizability of the LFUs and LFIUs introduced here has not
been studied yet.
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